Abstract Many have rejected contextualism about 'knows' because the view runs into trouble with intra-and inter-contextual disagreement reports. My aim in this paper is to show that this is a mistake. First, I outline four desiderata for a contextualist solution to the problem. Second, I
good reason to reject contextualism.
The Desiderata
What would contextualists need to do in order to deal with the assessment and disagreement problems? In what follows I motivate four desiderata for a contextualist solution.
First, contextualism is motivated by intuitions about the appropriateness of 'knowledge' ascriptions and denials in cases like PUB, STRINGENT POLLY and POLICE STATION. If intuitions about the appropriateness of 'knowledge' ascriptions and denials are part of the motivation for contextualism then, absent some independently plausible explanation why, contextualists can't just deny other intuitions, such as the intuition that Polly and Dougal's uses of the disagreement markers 'No you're/he's wrong' are perfectly appropriate, or the intuition that Ted, Polly and Dougal disagree. Here's MacFarlane: "One would also need to explain why the data that seems to support [contextualism] … should be taken so seriously, when the data about third-party assessments, retraction, and disputes are just thrown away. There is no clear reason to favor the "positive" data in this way" [2009: 149] .
A contextualist solution to the problems must not discard these intuitions. This is the first desideratum, which I'll call COMPATIBILITY. Second, a natural suggestion is to deal with STRINGENT POLLY and POLICE STATION by appeal to conversational implicatures, presuppositions or another pragmatic feature, the idea being that Ted, Polly and Dougal disagree over the pragmatic feature. I discuss this sort of solution below ( §3.2; §4). If the contextualist appeals to pragmatics, she must provide independent motivation for thinking that 'knowledge' ascriptions generate the relevant pragmatic feature. This is the second desideratum, which I'll call NOT AD HOC. Third, in the STRINGENT POLLY and POLICE STATION cases Polly and Dougal use the disagreement markers 'No you're/he's wrong.' But here are some other equally felicitous disagreement markers:
(1) Polly/Dougal: What Ted said/thinks/believes is wrong. He doesn't know that Jack performed the service.
Any contextualist solution to the problems has to deal with the full range of felicitous disagreement markers. This is the third desideratum, which I'll call RESPECT THE DATA. Fourth, in the STRINGENT POLLY and POLICE STATION cases Ted, Polly and Dougal seem to disagree. The contextualist has to identify the sense of disagreement in play, and she has to appeal to that sense in explaining the use of the various disagreement markers. This is the fourth desideratum, which I'll call LOCATE DISAGREEMENT. Prima facie, one would expect that contextualists will have a hard time satisfying this desideratum: Ted, Polly and Dougal's 'knowledge' ascriptions and denials may be consistent, so what can they disagree about? But this is too quick. First, it assumes that disagreement must always concern whatever proposition is literally expressed, and therefore Ted, Polly and Dougal can't disagree because the propositions literally expressed by their ascriptions and denials may be consistent. Consider this case:
(2) Fred and Wilma are discussing who stole Wilma's money.
Fred: I was told that Barney stole the money.
Wilma: No that's wrong. Barney didn't steal the money.
The most plausible interpretation of (2) is that Wilma disagrees with Fred about whether Barney stole the money, not about whether Fred was told that Barney stole the money. In support of this note that Wilma's objection is that Barney didn't steal the money, not that Fred wasn't told that Barney stole the money. This suggests that disagreement can sometimes concern whatever proposition is most salient, not whatever proposition is literally expressed, where the most salient proposition depends on a range of conversational factors (the purpose of the conversation, etc.). Given the purpose of the conversation, the most salient proposition in (2) is the proposition Barney stole the money.
Second, it assumes that disagreement must always concern doxastic attitudes, and therefore that Ted, Polly and Dougal can't disagree because they don't have incompatible beliefs. Consider another case: (3) Frank: I love haggis.
Stephen: No way! You're wrong. Haggis is disgusting.
I think it's natural to say that Frank and Stephen disagree. In support of this note that Stephen's rejoinder -'No way! You're wrong' -seems felicitous, but it's hard to see how that could be if Frank and Stephen didn't, in some sense, disagree. This suggests that disagreement can sometimes concern non-doxastic attitudes, and there can be genuine cases of 'attitudinal disagreement.' 3 The suggestion makes sense of (3) because Frank and Stephen clearly have incompatible non-doxastic attitudes towards haggis (Frank could not coherently adopt Stephen's attitude without abandoning his own, and vice versa). In §4 I'll say a little more about attitudinal disagreement, and I'll suggest that the contextualist can appeal to a sort of attitudinal disagreement to deal with the disagreement problem.
Two Unsatisfactory Solutions
I discuss two extant contextualist solutions to our problems. I argue that neither comes close to satisfying the four desiderata. While this section is largely negative, the discussion prepares the ground for §4.
Semantic Blindness
Many contextualists have tried to deal with the assessment and disagreement problems by appealing to the observation that competent speakers of a language are sometimes blind to the context-sensitivity of expressions in that language. The idea is that, because of this blindness, we mistakenly think that the speakers in cases like STRINGENT POLLY and POLICE STATION disagree, and the speakers in such cases mistakenly take themselves to disagree [see Cohen 1999: 77-9; DeRose 2009: Ch. 5] . Call this the 'semantic blindness strategy.' Note that the relevant blindness is of a particular sort, viz. blindness about when speakers disagree. I'll call this 'disagreement blindness', and I'll briefly return to it in §4.3.
The semantic blindness strategy is a non-starter. The strategy rejects the intuitions of competent speakers about when speakers disagree as a manifestation of some sort of blindness. But this prompts the question why the intuitions about the appropriateness of 'knowledge' ascriptions that are supposed to motivate contextualism aren't also a manifestation of some sort of blindness. The objection should be familiar: The strategy rejects some of the data (violating COMPATIBILITY and RESPECT THE DATA), and in the process undercuts the original motivation for contextualism.
Presuppositions of Commonality
It's perhaps plausible that 'knowledge' ascriptions usually carry the presupposition that the conversational participants are similar with respect to their epistemic standards. A presupposition is (roughly) a proposition that is part of the common ground, where a proposition is part of the common ground just in case all those in a conversation accept, it, all believe that all accept, and so on [see Stalnaker 2002] . The idea is that, in contexts where 'knowledge' ascriptions are made, it is usually part of the common ground that those involved in the conversation are similar with respect to their epistemic standards. Because this is usually part of the common ground, when we first encounter the STRINGENT Grice's maxim of quantity requires one to make one's conversational contributions as informative as required [1989: 26] . Because (6) violates Grice's maxim (the second conjunct asserts what the first conjunct presupposes), it is infelicitous. In contrast, both (7) and (8) are felicitous (the second conjuncts provide new information).
standards and that they disagree. But the problem for the contextualist is that many have argued that, because Polly and Ted disagree, 'knowledge' ascriptions aren't context-sensitive. 6 I'm using '#' to indicate pragmatic infelicity.
collective utterance very puzzling [see Baker 2012] . Compare and contrast:
(9) #I'm going to pick up my sister from the airport, although I haven't got a sister.
(10) I know that penguins eat fish, although we're not similar with respect to epistemic standards.
The subsequent denial of what is presupposed makes (9) very puzzling. In contrast, even without filling in the context (10) sounds fine.
I conclude that there are good reasons for thinking that 'knowledge' ascriptions don't usually carry the presupposition of commonality. To claim otherwise flies in the face of the best available evidence. 
Shifting Targets
My aim in this section is to develop solutions to the assessment and disagreement problems that avoid the pitfalls of the two solutions just discussed ( §4.1). I argue that these solutions promise to satisfy our four desiderata ( §4.2) and I deal with three objections to the solutions ( §4.3). The basic idea is that 'knowledge' ascriptions function pragmatically as recommendations. 8 In rough outline, the solution to the assessment problem has it that the proposition literally expressed by a 'knowledge' ascription is only conversationally relevant insofar as that ascription serves its pragmatic function. If an ascription no longer serves its function another proposition becomes relevant instead, namely the proposition that the ascription would have expressed had it been uttered in the present context. It is this proposition that is 'targeted' by the various disagreement markers. In similarly rough outline, the solution to the disagreement problem has it that disagreement over 'knowledge' ascriptions is a matter of conflicting recommendations.
7 Objection: One might think that the presupposition of commonality is like the presupposition that we speak the same language. In most conversational exchanges this presupposition is in place, but it doesn't seem to pass the three tests. Response: While this might help with the third objection, it won't help with the first or second objections. Imagine that, while Ailsa and Laurie speak different languages, they think that they speak the same language. Ailsa and Laurie happen to utter strings of words that are not just meaningful but actually contradictory in both their respective languages. Consequently, Ailsa and Laurie think they disagree. But, upon finding out that they actually speak different languages, the apparent disagreement disappears. In contrast, once Ted and Polly find out that they have different epistemic standards, their apparent disagreement doesn't disappear. 8 For a similar idea for contextualism about 'ought' see Björnsson and Finlay [2010] .
The Solution
Recall (2) 'knowledge' ascriptions is to identify good informants. 9 The thought is that humans need information about the world around them, some of which we can obtain ourselves (through perception, introspection and the like), but most of which we need to get from others. We therefore have a further need for a way of keeping track of those who have the required information. A natural suggestion is that we keep track via our ascriptions of 'knowledge': in saying that a subject S 'knows' that p I identify S as a good informant on the matter of p. disagreement is a matter of incompatible non-doxastic attitudes -but she thinks of this as a matter of pragmatics rather than semantics (hence 'quasi'-expressivist). So I'll call this the 'quasiexpressivist strategy.'
I'd like to pause to deal with two worries about the quasi-expressivist strategy. First, I seem to be assuming that recommendations are just non-doxastic attitudes. If I recommend something I adopt a particular sort of pro-attitude towards that thing, but it's plausible that there's a lot more to recommending than this. This worry can be easily dealt with. While I agree that recommendations involve more than non-doxastic attitudes, it can hardly be denied that recommendations involve such attitudes, and I'm primarily interested in the non-doxastic attitude aspect of recommendations.
Second, one might argue that, while it's plausible that Ted recommends himself as a good informant on Jack's whereabouts for the purposes of his bet with Dougal, it's not plausible that
Ted recommends himself as a good informant for the purposes of police investigations, or for someone like Polly who adopts stringent epistemic standards. But the quasi-expressivist strategy requires that Ted recommends himself as a good informant for all of these purposes, and more besides. I think this worry is more pressing. To address it I will start with some remarks about recommendations in general.
The worry is that the recommendation expressed by Ted's 'knowledge' ascription has to be qualified or restricted in certain ways, and in particular to some but not all purposes. There are various ways in which one can qualify or otherwise restrict a recommendation (this list is not meant to be exhaustive, and the items on it aren't meant to be mutually exclusive):
1. Qualification of the thing recommended; for example, I recommend that you try the blue cheese on the cheeseboard at a restaurant, as opposed to just recommending that you try the cheeseboard.
2. Qualification of the audience to whom that thing is recommended; for example, I
recommend that you try the cheese, unless you dislike cheese.
Qualification of the circumstances in which that thing is recommended; for example, I
recommend that you go for a walk later, unless it starts to rain heavily.
While recommendations can be qualified or otherwise restricted in these ways, they are often not qualified. Thus, rather than saying 'I recommend that you go for a walk later, unless it starts to rain heavily' I will often just say 'I recommend that you go for a walk later', even though I have no reason for thinking you should go for a walk in the rain. This is no doubt partly for practical reasons: even if one were aware of the ways in which some recommendation had to be qualified or restricted, it would often be tiresome and unnecessary to give the various qualifications and restrictions. More importantly, those issuing recommendations often have no idea whether they need to be qualified, or about how to go about making the relevant qualifications. Again, I might recommend that you go for a walk later, even though I am aware that there are certain circumstances in which you would be best off not going for a walk; for example, if you suffer from a hidden ailment that makes walking a bad idea. Because I have no idea whether those circumstances obtain, or even what those circumstances might be, I can hardly qualify my recommendation accordingly.
Another reason why one might not qualify or otherwise restrict a recommendation is that doing so has the potential to nullify the intended effect of the recommendation. We usually issue recommendations in order to bring about effects; my purpose in recommending that you go for a walk later is to bring it about that you go for a walk later. Imagine that neither you nor I have any reason to think that it will rain heavily later (it's summer, and the weather has generally been good). Saying 'I recommend that you go for a walk later, unless it starts to rain heavily' -as opposed to 'I recommend that you go for a walk later' -makes the possibility that it might rain heavily later salient, and so has the potential to discourage you from preparing to go for a walk ('I'll not go after all. It might rain, and I haven't got a jacket'). Often, if I want to bring about the intended effect, I am well advised to not qualify or restrict my recommendation.
While these aspects of our recommendation-issuing practice might look somewhat problematicwhy do we issue unqualified or unrestricted recommendations so readily given our ignorance? -I think it is a fairly accurate description of the practice. For better or worse, when we issue recommendations we often don't restrict them to certain circumstances, or qualify the audience to whom we are making the recommendation.
Turning back to the recommendations expressed by 'knowledge' ascriptions, like recommendations in general they can be restricted or qualified in a range of ways, for instance:
1. Qualification of the subject matter; for example, I recommend Ailsa as a good informant on the matter of when the train to London leaves (rather than, say, when the train to Paris leaves).
Qualification of the purposes; for example, I recommend Ted as a good informant, but not for the purposes of police investigations.
I'm particularly interested in the second way, and I'll focus on it in what follows. Again, even though the recommendations expressed by 'knowledge' ascriptions can be restricted or qualified to some but not all purposes, there are a number of reasons why they will often not be so restricted. 11 First, there will often be practical reasons for not restricting them in this way.
Consider Ted's situation in PUB. Ted is just having a chat with a friend, and in this sort of situation it would be tiresome and unnecessary to qualify or otherwise restrict his recommendation of himself as a good informant to some set of purposes. More importantly, while Ted may recognise that his recommendation might not be suited to all future purposes, he has little idea which purposes it is suited to, or which it isn't. Because he has little idea what those circumstances are, he can hardly qualify his recommendation accordingly. Faced with a choice between issuing a recommendation not restricted to some set of purposes and not issuing a recommendation at all, and given the point of his conversation with Tom (to explain why he lost the bet), Ted is best off opting for the former.
Another reason why one might not restrict a recommendation of some subject as a good informant to some set of purposes is that doing so has the potential to nullify the intended effect of the recommendation. Again, consider Ted's situation in PUB. Ted's aim in recommending himself as a good informant on the matter of whether Jack performed the service is to identify himself as someone with information that explains why Ted has lost his bet, and to get Tom to accept him as someone with information that explains why he lost. If Ted had restricted his recommendation by indicating that he would not be a good informant for certain purposes, that might well have prevented Tom from accepting Ted as someone with information that explains why Ted lost. Here, as is often the case, if Ted wants to achieve his aim he is well advised to not qualify or restrict his recommendation.
The quasi-expressivist strategy requires that Ted recommends himself as a good informant for a wide range of purposes, including for the purposes of police investigations, and for the purposes of someone like Polly, who generally adopts stringent epistemic standards. For the reasons just 11 I don't deny that one might recommend some subject as a good informant on some matter for certain purposes but not for others, for instance by making the restriction to those purposes explicit. The aim in the main body of the text is to give a number of reasons for thinking that, absent any special reason to think a recommendation of a good informant is being restricted in this way, the recommendation is unrestricted.
given, I think it's plausible that Ted's recommendation isn't restricted to some but not all of these purposes. However, one might worry that, while the recommendation expressed by Ted's 'knowledge' ascription isn't restricted, it doesn't make sense for Polly or Dougal to express disagreement with that recommendation. But consider how recommendations work in general.
Suppose Catriona recommends that Ailsa take a walk. If it starts to rain Ailsa might say 'Catriona recommended that I take a walk, but she was wrong -it's raining outside.' Even if we stipulate that Catriona wouldn't recommend Ailsa taking a walk in the rain, Ailsa's reply is felicitous, and it is natural to describe her as disagreeing with Catriona's recommendation. This suggests that, when a recommendation isn't restricted in so as to rule out certain circumstances or purposes, it makes sense to object that the recommendation doesn't hold in those circumstances.
Consequently, the quasi-expressivist strategy is supported by general observations about how recommendations work.
This completes the presentation of my solutions to the assessment and disagreement problems.
In the remainder of this paper I discuss how the solutions fair with the four desiderata ( §4.2) and deal with three further objections ( §4.3).
The Desiderata
In this sub-section I argue that my solutions to the assessment and disagreement problems satisfy the four desiderata outlined in §2.2. I'll take each desideratum in turn. them. In each case the disagreement marker is being used to assess the target content.
Consequently, the solutions RESPECT THE DATA.
LOCATE DISAGREEMENT: On the quasi-expressivist strategy, the relevant sort of disagreement is attitudinal. Consequently, the solution to the disagreement problem locates the relevant sense of disagreement.
The Objections
On the solutions proposed in §4. (2) Fred: I was told that Barney stole the money.
The target content here is the proposition Barney stole the money, and Fred and Wilma disagree about whether that proposition is true. This invites three objections, which I take in turn.
First objection: I have illegitimately traded on an analogy between (2) and STRINGENT POLLY. This objection can be easily dealt with. I've only made use of (2) in order to show that disagreement and assessment can concern whatever proposition is most salient, which need not be the proposition that was literally expressed. My argument doesn't rely on an analogy between (2) and STRINGENT POLLY.
Second objection: The disconnect between assessment and disagreement is problematic for two reasons. First, on the shifting target strategy the proposition that is assessed need not be one of the propositions that the speaker expressed (or judged/believed). This, one might think, is odd.
Second, recall that the shifting target strategy aims to explain why Polly or Dougal could felicitously say the following: In response I'm inclined to appeal to a limited sort of semantic blindness, viz. blindness about how disagreement over 'knowledge' ascriptions works, and in particular about what hearers are assessing when they assess 'knowledge' ascriptions and denials. The idea is that we mistakenly think that assessment of and disagreement about 'knowledge' ascriptions concern one and the same thing. In contrast with the appeal to semantic blindness discussed in §3.1 -what I called 'disagreement blindness' -this sort of blindness doesn't threaten to undercut the original motivations for contextualism. The contextualist who appeals to disagreement blindness is forced to say that apparent disagreement about 'knowledge' ascriptions is merely apparent. In contrast, the contextualist who appeals to the sort of blindness I'm suggesting takes intuitions about when speakers disagree at face value, but adds that we are blind to certain aspects of how disagreement about 'knowledge' ascriptions works. I don't see why a semantic theory should be expected to take intuitions about how disagreement works into account. We don't expect a semantic theory of some context-sensitive expression to take how competent speakers think context-sensitivity works into account. So why expect a semantic theory to take how competent speakers think disagreement works into account?
Third objection: The shifting target strategy holds that Polly and Dougal can felicitously negatively assess Ted's 'knowledge' ascription because, in doing so, they are assessing the proposition that the ascription would have expressed had it been made in their contexts, rather than the proposition that it actually expressed. But it is consistent with this that the following is, strictly speaking, true: The worry is that, far from only being committed to a limited sort of semantic blindness, the shifting target strategy is committed to widespread error. Competent speakers like Polly and Dougal can only felicitously negatively assess Ted's 'knowledge' ascription if they mistakenly think that (12) is false.
I'll make two points in response. First, the error in question -that of speakers disagreeing with those whom they mistakenly take to have spoken falsely -is familiar and widespread. Recall our case of attitudinal disagreement, (3):
A common feature of cases of attitudinal disagreement is that those involved often do mistakenly take their opponents to be wrong about some matter of fact, or to have some false belief. One can fill in the details of (3) Second, and more importantly, the objection is most forceful on the assumption that the fundamental interest driving our assessment of and disagreement about 'knowledge' ascriptions is with truth and falsity. If we want to find out whether those around us are making true 'knowledge' ascriptions and denials it would be problematic that we're often wrong about the truth-values of those ascriptions and denials. But, as I argued in §4.1, the fundamental interest driving assessment and disagreement is with identifying good informants. Consequently, we only want to find out whether those around us are making true 'knowledge' ascriptions insofar as doing so helps us identify good informants. In STRINGENT POLLY and POLICE STATION Polly and Dougal recognise that Ted's 'knowledge' ascription doesn't serve to identify him as a good informant. That he speaks, judges or believes truly isn't important. So, while the shifting target strategy attributes a sort of error to Polly and Dougal, they aren't in error about what's important when it comes to assessing and disagreeing about 'knowledge' ascriptions, viz. the identification of good informants.
Concluding Remarks
The usual story is that intra-and inter-contextual disagreement reports provide good reason to reject contextualism. Contra the usual story I have argued that contextualists can deal with both sorts of disagreement reports. Those who wish to motivate adopting a noncontextualist semantics for 'knowledge' ascriptions have to look elsewhere. 
